This paper assumes that financial fluctuations are the result of the dynamic interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions of individual economic units. The framework is an extention of Sordi and Vercelli (this issue) de signed as an heterogeneous agent model which proceeds through discrete time steps within a finite time horizon. The interaction at the micro-level between economic units monitors the spread of contagion and systemic risk, producing interesting complex dynamics. The model is analyzed by means of numerical simulations and systemic risk modelling, where local interaction of units is captured and analysed by the bilateral provision of liquidity among units. The behavior and evolution of economic units are studied for different parameter regimes in order to investigate the relation between units' expec tations, liquidity regimes and contagion. Liquidity policy implications are briefly discussed.
Structural Contagion and Vulnerability to Unexpected
Liquidity Shortfalls 1
Introduction 2
The complex dynamics of financial fluctuations reflects the impact of indi 3 vidual decisions on the macro variables of the economy within the technolog 4 ical, financial and institutional constraints characterizing a given economy.
between the units' balance sheets that heavily affects their behavior.
16
A case in point is the so-called "contagion" that has played a crucial role 17 in recent financial crises and has enhanced systemic risk. 
36
This work will address the problem of systemic risk by modelling the ori 37 gins of contagion as a result of an endogenous liquidity shock closely related 2 According to the Bank of International Settlements, systemic risk is defined as "the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties" (BIS, 1994) 2 38 to the "bank run" approach, in which the trigger event is driven by the eco 39 nomic business cycle as described in Sordi and Vercelli ( The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the approach ex Therefore, the elements of the row i describe the outflows of the unit i, while the elements of the column j describes the inflows of the unit j.
The sum of the elements of the row i equals the total outflow of unit i, 76 while the sum of the elements of the column j equals the total inflos of unit 77 j.
j 79 define the total inflows and outflows respectively.
80
We measure the liquidity of unit i at time t according to Sordi and Vercelli 81 (this issue) as the surplus of financial inflows y i,t minus financial outflows 82 e i,t , all flows being measured at the same time unit. We can then define the 83 liquidity index for unit i at time t, f i,t , as
84 On the other hand, the solvency of the unit is captured by its "net worth", 85 defined as the discounted value of its expected surpluses and deficits. We 86 define the solvency index for unit i at time t, f * i,t , as from (4) we arrive at the equation
where a i = − 1 and where, tations respectively, and with b a small positive magnitude, we have:
,
In this definition of the parameter β er , the crucial role is played by µ that target that unit i aims to achieve at t + 1. It is described by the dynamic
Then, we define here the desired liquidity index the liquidity as
106 Following Sordi and Vercelli (this issue), when a unit at time t is aware that 107 the value of its solvency index is greater than the safety margin µ i , it reacts 108 (in the next period) by reducing outflows relative to inflows and vice versa 109 when the value of its index is less than µ i .
110
The intended contribution of this paper is the description and imple 111 mentation of the micro-interactions between units that originate from their 112 attempts to meet their individual liquidity targets. As a preliminary step, 113 the latter are described and discussed in the next section. 
123
The value of z captures the absolute change of the current liquidity index 
Matching mechanism 132
In principle there is an infinite number of ways to adjust e i,t+1 and y i,t+1 
141
We define two new variables τ i,t y and τ i,t e as percentage change in y and e, 142 consistent with f � as 5 The same results may be achieved by decreasing inflows (for negative z) or outflows (for positive z). However, this second option would require renegotiation procedures between parties about previous deals with penalties to be paid from the party who decides to withdraw from a contract. As we are only interested in the evolution of the indices (not inflow and/or outflows separately), the incremental mechanism is the easiest solution at this stage.
i,t 0 otherwise.
As we can see in (9) and (10) fore, the two populations will try to achieve different investment decisions,
151
either by increasing inflows (τ y ) or by increasing outflows (τ e ).
152
The evolution of each bilateral flow x ij is computed according to of the flow x ij that agents i and j would like to achieve for next period 160 respectively), prevents an overincrease of x ij that would be above the limit 161 of one of the two parties. We define the central bank intervention C i,t for unit i for next time period
where λ 
Values of L t+1 in (13) greater than the sum of all liquidity needs from the 
195 where, as we know from (12), the value of C i,t+1 also depends on the Central
196
Bank support.
6 Note that the adjustment of λ 
208
The matching mechanism will split the units into those willing to either The first scenario we present describes an environment with an liquidity 240 buffer that approaches to infinity held by the central bank at every step.
241
This means that units can always meet their liquidity needs by borrowing 242 money from the central bank if the market cannot provide enough liquidity.
243
As L approaches infinity, λ C will converge to 1 ∀t = 1, . . . , S which means all events. The impact of this liquidity policy is pictured in Figure 3 , where
264
The 22% liquidity deficit faced by the units at time 134 caused unit 3 to 265 go bankrupt, which occurs at time 139. Unit 3 was the only unit facing a 
275
The last scenario, with a more rigid monetary policy, will describe a 276 different outcome for this unit. 
278
In the last scenario we reduce further the maximum liquidity buffer L to 279 0.08.
280
As shown in Figure 4 , the lack of systemic liquidity is more substantial The initialization of the parameters related to the units behavior are the to liquidity distress. This can be observed in Figure 6 with T = 4. As 10 An interesting extension to the model would be to limit the number of counterparties each unit can have. That would allow us to study the contribution of the specific topology of the network flows among economic units to the spread of contagion. As this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we will leave it to future work. 329 units take more exposed positions, they end up using regressive expectations 330 even with high levels of L (no lack of liquidity due to limited amount of 331 L) just because of their strategy. In this scenario, units seem to have an 332 altered perception of the liquidity policy in operation by the central bank 333 that causes the adoption of extrapolative expectations even with very tight 334 liquidity regimes. The outcome of this altered behavior is a jump in the 335 number of bankrupt units that were not able to realize in time how exposed 336 their position was. They should have recovered very quickly their loss by 337 using regressive expectations. However, the altered perception of market 338 conditions described above does not allow the units to realise their dangerous 339 situation, so increasing their chances of bankruptcy. 
